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SPEECH

bу

LT. GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS

before

THE ROTARY CLUB OF OKLAHOMA CITY

THE CIA AND WORLD AFFAIRS

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Mr. President, Chairman...

Thank you for the opportunity of coming here. It is not always easy in current day America to try to get over to the public perhaps the other side of the intelligence story. You have been reading a great deal of one side of it and we are always grateful—we do not have a public relations program, we do not go out and seek invitations, but if someone asks us and wants to hear what we have to say—we are always grateful for that.

I would like to say a few words about intelligence in America, what it means to the American people. First of all, what it is and why we need it. And then a few words about some of the publicity that has been given to some of the things that may or may not have been happening recently.

What is intelligence? Intelligence is basically information concerning the activities, intentions, the capabilities of foreign countries that may in some way impact upon the security of the United States, the livelihood of the American people, or what we are and will be as a country in the future and upon our allies.

How is the intelligence collected? The intelligence is collected in many ways. Somebody asked me about James

Bond the other day, and I said, "First of all, he's British, and second, he's one of the crosses we have to bear." He has projected an image that just doesn't relate to a great deal of what we do. First of all, an enormous amount of intelligence can be collected overtly or openly. Even during the war I remember we used to collect a great deal of order of battle, that is location of German units, by death notices in the German papers where they would list someone's death in serving in such and such a unit. And if you knew what division that particular expert belonged to, you could tell approximately where that division was.

This is an enormous amount of study. We collect it from the press, we collect it from broadcasts by foreign countries—we can find out what they re telling their own people, what they are telling their neighbors. You find out through all the overt processes of the U.S. Government through reporting of U.S. embassies, through the reporting of Treasury attaches, Agricultural attaches, or anybody else. Then you have technical intelligence. Intelligence collected by a number of extraordinary technical systems through which the genius of the American people—the mechanical genius—of the American people has been able to put at our disposal the means to overcome the secrecy of some of the great closed

societies which we have in the world today.

I would say that intelligence is very old, since

Joshua sent spies into the land of Canaan. But I think

America has made two great contributions to intelligence.

They have been in the field of technology and in the field of analysis.

The James Bond image doesn't fit the careful analysis by people who have been working on the problem for 15 to 20 years, who have been following it in close detail. And this is a very, very important part of our task. We have to collect this intelligence, together with our colleagues in the Defense Department, we have to analyze it, we have to evaluate it, and then we have to get this intelligence in timely fashion to the people who make the decisions on policy of the United States. And if you don't get it there in timely fashion, it's not intelligence; it's history.

Now in the old days intelligence always meant something purely military. If you got any economic intelligence at all, it was part of the military capability studies. Today, with billions of Petrodollars and Eurodollars wandering around the world being invested in ways that will affect the livelihood of the American workman, it is important for us to know what is going on in all these areas, how this

money is being used, what is it going to be applied to, because all this impacts on the life of the average

American.

Now I would like to make clear at the outset that the Central Intelligence Agency is not a policy-making organization. We are a service organization. We provide information to the United States Government. For instance, if I go down, on behalf of the Director, to a meeting in the White House and they are considering various courses of action, I tell them what will happen if they choose--or what may happen or what we think will happen--if they choose option one or option two or option three or option four. When they begin discussing what they should do, I will not participate in that argument. We are not a policy-making organization.

One day Kissinger went around the table and said, "What do you think?" The guy said, "No." He said, "What do you think?" and the guy said, "Yes." "And what do you think?" The guy said, "No." Then he pointed at me and I said, "No," and he said, "You don't have any vote." Then he went on to the others.

So you know you have read some of these distorted ideas about some sort of private government, operating under its own policies and everything else. We get policy direction;

we have direct guidance as to what we should be looking for; how we should be looking for it.

Now while our budget is not made public, our budget goes through exactly the same process as any other Government agency. Our budget is reported to the Appropriations Committees in great details; our budget is subject to all the controls by the Office of Management and Budget which other Government agencies are subjected to. It is simply that ours is not made public. And that is why in the last two years, Congress has voted twice on that issue on motions of people who wanted to make our budget public. And by a nearly two to one majority on both cases the Congress has rejected that.

Now if we were to make our budget public at any particular time, the Capitol wouldn't fall down; but if we could get the other side's budget—year after year, you can deduce a great deal from that. If you had a big project like the U-2 or the raising of the submarine, there would be a bulge—in the budget and people would start to say, "What is this?" and you would get an unraveling process.

Now, how did the present form of intelligence come into being? Well, the United States has always had good intelligence during its wars and we have always proceeded

with great speed to dismantle it as soon as the wars were over. This time we took a little longer because we had the Vietnam War, the Korean War and various other things. But the wreckers out there are at work now. We've always had in America a number of people who thought that intelligence was in some way un-American or immoral. As a matter of fact, Nathan Hale, a very brave young man and we have a statue of him outside our building--I was not one of those in favor of putting it there. I felt that anybody, any intelligence agent who got caught on his first mission and was carrying all the evidence on him, was not the example we should hold up to our young career trainees. But, in a breach of security that may or may not have cost him his life, he told a friend of his that he was going behind the British lines to spy. And this guy looked at him and he said, "How can you stoop so low?"

So we've had these people around and we have them now. They're vocal--they're all over--telling us that all that spying stuff is great for those dirty British, French, Russians, Germans, but not for us pure Americans. We're noble, we don't do that sort of thing.

Well, of course, that has no basis in historical fact.

The Founding Father, George Washington, was one of the most active users of intelligence in American history. I always

remember, you know, people say you've got to let everything hang out, you've got to tell everybody everything. There are two stories on Washington that I think are very appropriate on that.

One night he was going somewhere and he had spent the night at one of his sympathizer's house, and in the morning he got up on his horse to leave and the sympathizer's wife came out and said, "General, where are you riding tonight?" and he leaned down in the saddle and he said, "Madame, can you keep a certain secret?" She said, "Of course." He said, "And so can I," and he took to the saddle and rode on.

The other one was a letter he wrote to his chief of intelligence in New Jersey, Colonel Elias Dayton, in which he said, "The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that I need add nothing further on this score. All that remains for me to tell you is that these matters must be kept as secret as possible, for lack of such secrecy these enterprises, no matter how well conceived or how promising the outlook, generally fail. I am, Sir, your obedient servant. G. Washington"

He also had a training center during the Revolution for intelligence. I never like to discuss it. It was located in southwest Virginia and the name of it was Fort Looney so we tend to pass that over in silence.

Just so you will know, George Washington organized three separate kidnap attempts on Benedict Arnold. And I think we all know what he was going to do with him if he got him. He also attempted to kidnap Prince William of Britain who was George III's fourth son who later became King William IV, who was a midshipman in the Royal Navy in New York City in 1782 but that didn't work.

And then we have Benjamin Franklin. Benjamin Franklin, just three years before the Revolution in 1772-1775 was the Assistant Postmaster of British North America. You know what he was doing as Assistant Postmaster? He was opening that British mail like crazy and he got caught and he had to move out of that job rather rapidly. So he went to Paris where he represented the Revolutionists and he designed and had the French build him a printing press. You know what he was printing on the printing press? British passports, British currency, and fabricating atrocity stories.

So then you come further down the line to 1932. Mr. Stimson, a very distinguished American, was our Secretary of State. One day when he was Secretary of State and they handed him a decoded message of another country, he turned it away saying, "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail." Ten years later as Secretary of War he was very

busy reading other gentlemen's mail. That kind of an anti-intelligence mentality led us to Pearl Harbor.

Now at Pearl Harbor a lot of people think we were unlucky. We were lucky. The aircraft carriers were out, it was far away, and we had time to recover. Could we recover from a nuclear Pearl Harbor? Or do we have to have the information in advance to enable us to take those measures that will make sure it won't happen.

The last great intelligence investigation we had was in 1946 about Pearl Harbor. And what came out of that investigation was that in various parts of the U.S. Government there were various little pieces of information squirreled away which if they had been brought together, maybe we couldn't have prevented it, but we could have minimized it.

And that led to the creation of a central intelligence capability.

Now you've read a lot of stories about duplication and everything else, about Defense and CIA. There is a little duplication—it is not wasteful and it does not involve a large number of people. But I have always found that I can see a lot better out of those pair of binoculars than I can out of a telescope. Both Defense and we work on the same data base. We are not squirreling away all those private reports from one another; we are working

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together, our analysts are meeting every day. The top people of all the Intelligence Community of the United States meet at least once a week to discuss the major policies and so forth.

When Congress set up the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, they didn't want to say that it was to engage in espionage so they said, "it will do such other things as the National Security Council may direct." They knew perfectly well what we were going to do. Because we were set up under the National Security Act, our immediate oversight committees who have oversight over us are the Armed Services Committees, and obviously the Appropriations Committees of both Houses because they are the ones give us our money. And also Government Operations. we have had added to that the Foreign Relations Committees. So we have about a hundred Congressmen who are on our various Committees who have oversight and from whom we have I repeat, we have no secrets. Now that overno secrets. sight has been exercised in various ways. At a time when Americans felt very threatened, they weren't too concerned with what their intelligence was doing; they just wanted to know.

Today, for some odd reason, we don't feel particularly threatened, so we want a very close oversight. We can live with any kind of oversight the Congress prescribes.

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It is a unique American process. No one else in the world has it. When they have an intelligence problem, they appoint a committee from outside of distinguished citizens and they investigate it. Ours does not present any real problems. We have not really had problems of security with our own Oversight Committees. Our security problems have come mostly from the Select Committees.

What is the real issue facing the American people today? Do they want to have eyes to see and ears to hear in the last quarter of the twentieth century or do they want to stumble forward into the future blind and deaf until they day we have to choose between nuclear blackmail and abject surrender? That is the real issue before the American people.

Now we have today in the United States a massive assault on intelligence. An attempt to portray us as murderers, un-American, crooks. The other day I saw a cartoon and it showed a couple at the movies and the man leaned over to his wife and said, "You know, this must be a real old movie; the CIA are the good guys." This is the kind of thing we've got, "The Five Days of the

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Vulture" or some other thing that's going around. If
the Central Intelligence Agency were that kind of an
agency, I wouldn't be its Deputy Director. I don't mind
being attacked by the Soviets, but when you have the
Americans doing the dirty work for the others, I don't
find it particularly attractive.

We have a very tough situation confronting us. Not since Valley Forge has any foreign power had the capability—I am not discussing the intentions—I am saying the physical capability to inflict serious or mortal damage on the United States which we see today in the Soviet Union.

What do we see? We see the Soviet Union deploying four or five third generation sets of missiles, four or five sets--categories-- of third generation missiles-- intercontinental missiles that can strike the United States. We see the Soviets developing aircraft with a capability against the heartland of the United States. We see the Soviets developing a blue water navy that is capable of going everywhere. We see them building newer and larger submarines, with more launching tubes for intercontinental ballistic missiles. We see them developing new naval missiles that they can fire from their own waters at us. We see them in all the oceans of the world; we see them

in their conventional forces facing NATO in Europe, but within the Soviet Union improving the number, the quality of their tanks, of their conventional equipment of all sorts, with a massive effort totally unparalleled in the United States in anti-aircraft defense of the battlefield of the homeland. We see in the last few years the Armed Forces of the United States have gone down by a million men and those of the Soviet Union have gone up by a million men, which gives us a clear difference of two million.

We have all of these things going on and for some odd reason everybody says don't worry about intelligence. Now the fact is intelligence tells you--or should tell you--what can be a threat to your people, not just to your Government. Today, it is your people. We had fifteen years ago a great debate about a missile gap. Our intelligence is such today that you couldn't have a debate about a missile gap. We know what they have; and they know that we know. And that is important because it has a deterrent effect in itself.

We must continue to know. The great questions which lie ahead of us and which absorb the overwhelming interest of my agency--it is not in overthrowing governments in Central America or doing something or other in some remote part of the world. The great questions to which we owe the

American people the answers are: Who will be in control of the Soviet Union five years from today; what will their intentions be towards us and towards our Allies; what is there in Soviet research and development today that will impact on the lives of Americans five or ten years down the road? And the same questions for China.

And the American people look to us for the answers to those questions. We try and furnish them. We accept opposition from the other side; it is when we have opposition from our own side that the work is particularly difficult.

Now we get into these things you've been hearing about. Let's look at them. First of all, I cannot tell you that among the 76,000 people who have passed through the Central Intelligence Agency in the last 27 years we haven't had people who showed poor judgment, who haven't been overzealous, who haven't done some things we would have preferred they didn't do. We have had our share of kooks, of people of all sorts, I can't tell you we haven't.

The other day a Congressman said to me, "How can we eliminate abuses in the intelligence community?" I said, "Congressman, as long as intelligence services are made up by governments, congresses, or any other human organizations of people, you can endeavor to eliminate, you can endeavor

to minimize abuses; but you can never legislate them out of existence." You can't legislate virtue; you have to choose the right people and if they don't do their job you have to get rid of them and you punish them.

But to go back to this, let's get into it a little bit. You have had all this noise about assassinations. What was the final finding of it—that nobody had been assassinated. You've had all these stories about toxins. What was the finding—the toxins had never been used. Drugs. Somebody had shown extremely poor judgment in giving a drug to this man who then committed suicide. That was unfortunate. You had the story of massive telephone taps. The Central Intelligence Agency has carried out 32 telephone taps in 27 years. That's a tap and a half a year.

The Director of Central Intelligence is the only person in the United States Government who is charged by law with the protection of his sources and methods of the security of his own organization.

Now how did we get into some of these things? How we got into the assassinations I don't know; but they're talking about things dating back 15 or 20 years ago. I would presume that this talk probably came up at a time when

Fidel Castro was shooting people every day in the National Stadium in Havana in front of the television cameras. And there were some people who were probably very sore at him.

I repeat, the findings were that nobody had been assassinated.

How did we get into the drug business? Well, we saw a man like Cardinal Mindzenty of Hungary who had resisted every torture, every pressure and everything that the Nazis could do to break him, and who remained unbroken. suddenly we saw the Communists produce him in front of the movie cameras confessing abjectly anything his Communist masters wanted him to confess. Those of us who remember that time were convinced this was done with mind-bending drugs. We wanted to see how they worked in case they were used on our diplomats, on our armed services, that we would have some means of combating them. And it was not just the Central Intelligence Agency or the Armed Forces that were doing research on drugs. Many distinguished universities in the United States were engaged in the same kind of research and who didn't think there was anything particularly immoral about it.

On the toxins: The Soviets, in the years of the Fifties, killed several Soviet emigres by using these toxins in West Germany. We were concerned again that they would be used on us. We studied them; we looked into them for means of

defense or even means of retaliation if they were used on us. Then we locked them away and they remained locked away for 15 years. And you know who caught us with the toxins? We ourselves reported it to the Congress; they didn't catch us. We were looking around for questionable things and we found them and we reported them to Congress.

The telephone taps I've alluded to already.

So, as an example for instance on some of these things, the United States before World War II undertook that it wouldn't use gas. That didn't prevent the United States from manufacturing and storing millions of gas shells in case they were used against us by the Germans or the Japanese in World War II.

The trouble is that you have people today who are trying to judge what happened 15 or 20 years ago, or as I call it rather unkindly, "rummaging through the garbage pails of history," to try and find something they can pillory us with. President Kennedy told us this. He said, "You in intelligence are condemned to be pilloried publicly for your failures and to have your successes passed over in silence." This is part of the job. When you go into this kind of work you accept this.

How has this affected us? Well I would like to tell you that this has had a catastrophic affect on us and, therefore, it has got to stop. But it hasn't. First of

all it hasn't because the people in intelligence are a tough bunch of people. Harry Truman once said, "If you can't stand the heat you should stay out of the kitchen." Well I am not an old CIA man--I came there for the first time three and a half years ago--and I never cease to wonder at how many kitchen volunteers we have there. Here are these Americans that live by the same standards as other Americans, who perhaps have a higher than normal degree of dedication to the United States, who under a barrage of slander and innuendo unparalleled in American history are continuing to produce what I believe is the finest intelligence in the world. We have hundreds of people preparing for testimony, for answering Freedom of Information questions and everything else. The main thrust of the Agency goes on, along with our colleagues in Defense, in producing the intelligence which our country must have if it is to survive.

We will continue this. We feel the American people, in their wisdom, will understand that there is really no alternative to having an effective intelligence service. There is no second prize in the world. If we falter there is no one to pick up the torch. It is not just our fate; it is the fate of human freedom for a very long period of

time that is at stake. When I go in and out of work every day at the entrance to the Agency there is a group of stars carved into the wall that represent the men and women of the Agency who have fallen on the silent battlefield. Which, though it is silent, it is never quiet. They have fallen as truly for the United States as anyone who has fallen on the active battlefield. Across from them is the motto of the Agency and it says: You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free. Today it is more than that: You must know the truth for only the truth will keep you free.

I marvel at the ability of these people to produce it. I marvel at the skill of our technicians; I marvel at the dedication of those people in the clandestine services who are faced with a closed society as we are, risk their lives every day to make sure that you and I are not surprised.

Winston Churchill told my generation that we would have as our only companions on our journey, blood, sweat, tears and toil. I hope that the next generation of Americans will have three companions on their journey. I hope they will have faith to light the way ahead, for dark is the path of the man who treads without faith. I hope they will have enthusiasm, which drives the young

and enables the old and the young to continue to perform useful service to the nation. And most of all I pray that they will have courage, for courage is rightly worshiped as the greatest of all human virtues since it is the guarantee of all the others.

These people in Central Intelligence have courage, have dedication, and have faith. They will not let you down.